North Carolina's Growing Problem by French, Steven P.
North Carolina's Growing Problem
Steven P. French
While the exact amount of flood-hazard area
in North Carolina is unknown, a reputable 1973
study estimated this area to be 3,652,000
acres, or twelve percent of the total land area
of the state (Goddard, 1973). A total of 174
communities have been identified as flood-
prone by the National Flood Insurance Program.
Based on the number of flood insurance policies
in force in November 1978, North Carolina has
at least 18,647 structures located in flood-
hazard areas.
Traditionally, flooding has been less
serious in North Carolina (and the Southeast,
in general) than in several other parts of the
country. North Carolina did not develop urban
concentrations along major rivers or in
coastal areas around seaports, and the concen-
tration of development in the piedmont area of
the state, where flooding is relatively less
severe, has been a major factor in North
Carolina's past record of small flood losses.
Recent changes in the pattern of develop-
ment, however, are likely to lead to serious
flood problems in the future. The records of
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
show that there is continuing encroachment by
new development on hazardous areas. In 1977,
the most recent year for which records are
available, 1,927 construction permits were re-
ported for flood hazard areas in North Carolina.
...the concentration of development in
the piedmont area... has been a major
factor in North Carolina's past record
of small flood losses."
Assuming an average value of only $30,000 per
construction permit, this number of permits
represents an investment in hazardous areas of
$57 million in 1977 alone.
NFIP records also indicate that the ser-
iousness of the flood hazard and the rate of
encroachment vary among the regions of the
state. For example, the number of flood
insurance policies issued in the coastal area
(5,034) is more than four times the number in
the Piedmont region (1,183), even though the
Piedmont contains the bulk of the state's
population and urban development. The number
of policies in the coastal area is nearly ten
times greater than those issued in the mountain
area (531), even though the most recent floods
have been in the mountains. If the purchasers
of flood insurance are acting rationally, the
potential flood hazard is considerably more
severe in the coastal area than in the rest of
the state. Additionally, the number of
construction permits issued in hazardous
coastal areas in 1977 was ten times the number
issued in either of the other two regions.
Given that there is a significant amount
of urbanization in hazardous areas in North
Carolina, what are the causes of this problem?
The natural amenities offered by hazard areas
seems to be one of the most important factors.
ACCESSIBILITY TO URBAN SERVICES AND
PROXIMITY TO NATURAL AMENITIES WERE
TWO ADVANTAGES MOST OFTEN CITED IN A
SURVEY OF FL00DPLAIN OCCUPANTS."
A 1971 study found that many floodplain resi-
dents were willing to bear the risk of flooding
to enjoy the perceived advantages of locating
there (James et al., 1971). Accessibility to
urban services and proximity to natural ameni-
ties were two advantages most often cited in a
survey of floodplain occupants. Given the
location of encroachment in hazardous areas of
North Carolina, proximity to natural amenities
would seem to be the major factor.
Flood insurance poses another problem for
controlling the urbanization of flood-hazard
areas. The existence of such insurance may
encourage banks to provide financing that would
otherwise not be available. Furthermore,
underpricing of insurance may encourage un-
desirable urbanization since occupants do not
bear the full cost of their location decisions.
Current methods used to determine flood in-
surance premiums have been questioned. Since
the methods for computing flood probabilities
were developed for riverine flooding, wave and
wind forces may not be accounted for correctly
in calculating premiums for coastal areas. A
study of losses associated with Hurricane
Eloise indicates that actual losses signifi-
cantly exceeded the losses predicted by the
Federal Insurance Administration (Shows, 1977).
The nearly ten thousand flood insurance
policies in emergency program communities in
North Carolina may be stimulating the urbani-
zation of hazardous areas by actually sub-
26 Carolina planning
sidizing such development in some cases and
by making financing available in others.
The final factor leading to urbanization
of hazardous areas in North Carolina is the
lack of a state program for floodplain manage-
ment. The Floodway Regulation Law adopted in
1971 has never received funding from the state
or federal level (Stewart et al
.
, 1978). This
lack of funding places the entire responsi-
bility for managing and regulating flood
hazards with local government, except in the
coastal areas which are covered by the Coastal
Area Management Act (CAMA) . Even under CAMA,
however, local government has the primary role
in regulating hazard areas; this job is too
difficult for local government to handle alone,
especially considering the fiscal incentives
local government has to increase the property
tax base through new development.
In summary, there has been little or no
effort by state or local government to dis-
courage the trend toward large scale urbani-
zation of flood hazard areas in North Carolina.
Without some form of planned intervention,
flood losses of life and property in North
Carolina can be expected to continue climbing
in the coming years.
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tax and subsidy policy maintains efficient land
uses while discouraging socially unproductive
uses that are also uneconomical to the
entrepreneur.
We can use taxes and subsidies to change an
individual's awareness and perception of flood
hazard, and provide artificial price incentives
for more economically efficient responses.
Taxes should be structured to provide periodic
reminders to floodplain occupants and should be
collected frequently enough so that occupants
can contemplate leaving or floodproof ing;
annual or semi-annual tax payments should
suffice. It must be remembered that if the tax
is too low, the program will not be effective.
Nor should the tax be set so high that it tries
to prevent all potential flood losses, espe-
cially rare, low-probability floods. The 100-
year flood is a generally accepted standard.
As for subsidies, decisions of individuals and
firms to relocate outside the floodplain are
affected more by a one-time payment, since
moving is a one-time event, whereas the deci-
sion to remain is made continuously or at cer-
tain discrete time intervals. Taxes and sub-
sidies may be adjusted until the right levels
are achieved, but they should be stable enough
so that decisions can be made more readily.
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH AND EQUITY
The economic approach allows long-term
residents with sentimental ties to an area to
remain, providing they pay the social costs and
bear the risk for their own decision. Thus,
residents retain more freedom of choice.
Disincentives and incentives are more equitable
than direct regulation because people are not
forced to take specific actions.
Equity is also served because people who
live outside the floodplain are not forced to
pay as much to protect floodplain residents.
This savings occurs even if subsidies are used
to encourage relocation because less money will
be paid out for structural projects, damage,
relief, and rescue expenditures.
If the taxing option is chosen, the tax
burden may go up in the floodplain itself, but
the overall tax burden in the region will go
down. Still more critical from an equity
standpoint, third party taxation of non-flood-
plain residents for the benefit of floodplain
residents will decrease. The burden will fall
on those individuals and firms whose activities
are more closely associated with the flood
hazard. Furthermore, states are relatively
free to impose new tax and subsidy programs on
existing residents.
Economic tools can also be tailor-made to
minimize impacts on those who can bear them the
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